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A new approach was recently proposed to effectively and
objectively evaluate risk management methodologies and tools
for their suitability to a given organizational situation.
The proposed approach, known as CERTS, is based on defining
suitability in terms of criteria which in turn are described
in terms of attributes and metrics. Using the Analytic
Hierarchy Process, this thesis develops the CERTS approach
into a Decision Support System, that could be used easily and
effectively by organizations for selecting a risk management
methodology or tool. The thesis also applies the developed
DSS to three case studies to gain insights on the
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The need for acceptable computer security risk management
practices is becoming more evident throughout the federal and
commercial environment because of the sophistication and
complexity of today's technology and the increased value
society has placed on information. Research over the last
four to five years has focused on establishment and refinement
of a formalized framework for risk management (Katzke, 1988
and Mayerfeld, 1989), and many automated tools have been
developed by commercial and governmental organizations.
Despite the attention given to the development of a framework,
little has been done to establish a technique for determining
which risk management methodology or tool is most suitable for
a given organizational situation.
To overcome this deficiency, a new method was recently
proposed to effectively and objectively evaluate risk
management methodologies and tools for their suitability to a
given organizational situation (Garrabrants , Ellis, Hoffman,
and Kamel , 1990). The proposed approach, known as CERTS, is
based on defining suitability in terms of criteria which in
turn are described in terms of attributes. These attributes
are further decomposed into metrics that could objectively be
applied to the methodology or tool under consideration for a
given organizational situation. A mathematical model could
then be used to combine metric evaluations with weights
assigned to criteria, attributes and metrics to obtain an
overall suitability index of each alternative methodology or
tool .
By using the proposed methodology, determining the
suitability of particular method or tool becomes standardized,
flexible, and expandable. The method is standardized since a
uniform set of criteria, attributes, and metrics are used.
The method is also flexible because different weights could be
assigned to metrics, attributes, and criteria according to the
organizational situation. Finally, as the definition of
suitability is refined, the method is expandable by simply
adding additional metrics, attributes, and criteria.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this research is to develop the CERTS
method into a Decision Support System (DSS) that could be used
easily and effectively by management personnel for selecting
a risk management methodology or tool. Currently the proposed
method relies on a series of manual questionnaires which are
tedious and time consuming.
In addition to building a Decision Support System the
research aims at applying the proposed method. To accomplish
this goal, we apply the developed DSS to three hypothetical
case studies. Each case study represents a different
environment that requires the use of a risk management tool to
assess the risks that each environment faces.
Based on the application of the method to the case
studies, we expect to gain useful insight that could be used
later to refine the method, by adding, removing, or modifying
criteria, attributes or metrics, to accurately select the most
appropriate methodology or tool to fit the particular
organizational requirement.
C. RESEARCH QUESTION
The main research question addressed by this thesis is:
Can an effective Decision Support System based on the CERTS
approach be developed to assist organizations in selecting the
most appropriate risk management tool for their environment?
A secondary research question is to determine whether the
developed decision support system could be applied
successfully in different environments to select the best risk
management tool
.
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
For the purpose of this study, the decision support system
was limited to three risk management packages. The three
packages selected for inclusion in this study were based upon
recommendations by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) Risk Management Laboratory.
The case studies developed in Chapter V are hypothetical
situations developed from cases used by NIST for testing and
evaluating the risk management packages at the laboratory.
These situations have been expounded upon by the authors to
actually test the CERTS Decision Support System.
To allow for testing, comparisons, and familiarization of
the risk management packages, the authors spent three days at
the NIST Risk Management Laboratory in Gaithersburg, Maryland.
Nicki Lynch and Irene Gilbert were invaluable in helping the
authors evaluate the three selected packages.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
To accomplish our objective, the methodology consists of
three phases: 1) Literature Review, 2) Implementing the
Comparative Method, and 3) Testing the Proposed Method by
applying it to three case studies. These phases are detailed
below.
1. Literature Review
First, Garrabrants and Ellis' thesis (Garrabrants and
Ellis, 1990) was reviewed for background information on CERTS.
Second, Thomas Saaty's Analytical Hierarchy Process (Saaty,
1980) was examined. Three candidate risk management tools
were selected, tested, analyzed, and compared at the National
Institute of Standards and Technologies Risk Management
Laboratory for inclusion in the developed DSS.
2. Implementing the Comparative Method
We have found the Expert Choice software to be an
excellent vehicle for implementing the proposed technique into
a Decision Support System. Expert Choice implements the
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), an approach to multi-
criteria decision making problems (Saaty, 1982). Under this
approach, a decision problem is structured in the form of a
hierarchy (tree). The root of the tree is the goal.
Intermediate levels of the tree represent the criteria used to
accomplish the goal, and at the bottom of the tree are the
leaves which represent the alternative choices. Users make
comparative judgements in order to establish the relative
importance between criteria and the preference of the
alternatives with respect to the specific qualities of a
criterion.
CERTS fits nicely within the framework of AHP.
Concepts of criteria, attributes, and metrics could be
incorporated readily at the intermediate levels of an AHP
decision hierarchy. At the bottom of the tree would be the
candidate methodologies or tools under consideration. Since
the proposed metrics are boolean questions, they need to be
modified and expressed in a form that allows the assignment of
numeric rather than boolean values.
The proposed Decision Support System served as the
structure for integrating the suggested modifications to the
boolean questions. The system assigned numeric weights to the
modified CERTS method for each methodology or tool. This
process completed the development of the CERTS Decision
Support System.
3. Testing the Proposed Method
In this phase, the developed Decision Support System
is tested by applying it to three case studies. The case
studies were developed via input from NIST and the authors.
Information inferred from the case studies was applied to the
prototype Decision Support System to make a recommended
selection for each case situation.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II reviews the CERTS approach. Chapter III
explains the underlying premise of the Analytic Hierarchy
Process used as the vehicle for implementing the decision
support system. Chapter IV describes the implementation of
the CERTS Decision Support System. Chapter V details the
application of the decision support system to three case
scenarios and discusses the results of the DSS for each case.
Chapter VI gives conclusions and recommendations about the
research and indicates directions for further research.
II. CERTS: A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION METHOD FOR RISK
MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGIES AND TOOLS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is designed to assist the reader in
understanding the basics of the Comparative Evaluation Method
for Risk Management Methodologies and Tools (CERTS). CERTS is
an evaluation method that uses metrics to determine the
suitability of a risk management methodology or methodological
tool for a particular organizational situation. It was
developed by Major William M. Garrabrants and Major Alfred W.
Ellis III both from the Computer Technology Curriculum, Naval
Postgraduate School (Garrabrants and Ellis, 1990). The
motivation behind their work is to develop a methodology for
comparing the large number of risk management methodologies
and tools available today. These methodologies and tools were
developed largely as a result of the decentralization of
automated data processing (ADP) systems and the increased
breadth of the information stored in the systems. As
Professor Lance Hoffman noted in the 1986 National Computer
Security Conference:
One significant lack today is metrics for risk analysis
and risk management. There is no currently accepted set
of criteria against which all methods can be compared. It
is difficult to evaluate or to convey the advantages and
disadvantages of a given methodology or tool when no
accepted evaluation metric exists. (Hoffman, 1986, p
157)
With the development of CERTS, an effort has been directed
toward the establishment of metrics for the evaluation of risk
analysis and risk management methods and the appraisal of the
numerous automated risk management tools currently available.
B. THE CERTS APPROACH
As stated above, the major objective for developing CERTS
was to develop a new technique to effectively and objectively
evaluate available risk management methodologies and tools
for organizations and to establish a means of comparing these
methodologies and tools. Garrabrants and Ellis concluded,
through their preliminary research, that risk analysis
criteria are a vital component of the selection of any risk
management procedure. Their research lead them to believe
that metrics could provide the means to measure a tool or
package for suitability, thus assisting the user in selecting
the most appropriate methodology for a given situation. This
belief solidified their ultimate objective in establishing a
standard set of metrics that could be used to evaluate risk
management methodologies and tools for an organizational
situation.
During the initial approach to this study, they discovered
there was no existing technique to compare the risk management
methodologies. Therefore, they developed an example of a
model , a paradigm, that promoted the comparison of risk
management methods utilizing factors such as suitability,
quality or acceptability. The ultimate purpose of this
approach was to remove the analysts' deficiencies or biases
from the evaluation, thereby assisting the analyst in
determining which methodology should be selected.
1. A Measure for Suitability
Technology has brought an abundance of new risks that
must be understood and addressed within the risk management
arena. Businesses, companies, federal agencies, and all users
of computer technology must be able to plan and forecast for
the probability of adverse events. Numerous quantitative and
analytical methods for risk management and decision-making
under uncertainty have been developed, but the question still
remains, "Which method is best for a particular situation?"
At this point the authors established a list of
prerequisites a risk manager must possess in order to
successfully accomplish this task. This list addressed the
necessity of understanding the system being managed, its
suitability to the purpose of the organization, and a thorough
understanding of a majority of the methods available. Several
risk management methods were found to be available for
determining risks. Among those reviewed were Quantitative,
Checklist, Scenario, Questionnaire methodologies, and hybrids
of each. The results revealed that each method has its own
strengths and weaknesses that depend on the nature of its use.
2. Steps for Suitability
Garrabrants and Ellis concluded in their literature
research that a great deal of effort had gone into the
development of risk management methodologies, but that the
methodologies lacked criteria and standardization. The
application and development of their criteria for evaluation
of computer security risk management methodologies followed
those of Merkhofer (Merkhofer, 1987), but differs in the
introduction of metrics which reduce the subjectivity of the
criteria
.
The next question to be addressed is how suitability
would be defined. Suitability is defined as those
characteristics of a risk management methodology or tool that
are pertinent and appropriate for the requirements of a
particular person, organization, system, and/or situation
(Garrabrants and Ellis, 1990). The steps to measuring
suitability is summarized in Table 1.
By implementing these steps, the analysis of
suitability became standardized, flexible, and expandable.
All criteria could now be compared consistently across all
methods and could provide the user with the capability of
expanding and weighing the criteria to meet his requirements.
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This process resulted in the culmination of seven
criteria composed of between two and four attributes. The
criteria are: consistency, useability, adaptability,
feasibility, completeness, validity, and credibility. (See
Table 2.
)
TABLE 1. STEPS FOR MEASURING SUITABILITY
1. Establish a set of criteria that describes a
method's suitability.
2. Define the suitability criteria in terms of related
attributes
.
3. Specify metrics that describe the presence of the
attributes
4. Make a quantitative statement of the appearance of
the suitability criteria by determining the ratio of
actual occurrences of the metric to the number of
possible occurrences.
5 ' Use the derived quantitative values for each of the
criteria to evaluate and compare the variety of
methods and tools available to the organization.
C. CRITERIA, ATTRIBUTES, AND METRICS
Once the seven criteria were developed, the authors
selected the unweighted normative relationship model to
formulate a simple mathematical relationship between the
metrics and their associated criteria. The derived
measurements of each attribute were viewed as a set, applied
to a mathematical expression in boolean terms, and expressed
as a ratio. In turn, each attribute within a criteria was
summed to determine the ratio for that criteria. After
11
determining each criteria's ratio, the ratios were summed and
applied to a mathematical expression resulting in a
suitability index ratio.
TABLE 2. SUITABILITY CRITERIA
Consistency
.
Given a particular system configuration,




The effort necessary to learn, operate,




The structure of the method or tool can be
applied to a variety of computer system configurations



















e results of the P rocess represent the real
Credibility
.
The output is be 1 ieva ble and has merit •
Throughout the process of developing the criteria, their
associated attributes, and metrics, the authors came to the
conclusion that not all of the criteria could be maximized
simultaneously. Some criteria are maximized at the expense of
others. Thus, determining the best risk management tool or
method would require trading one desirable trait for another.
Therefore, the suitability of a method could be determined
only after integrating the needs of an organization with the
process as developed in this thesis.
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1. Application of the Metrics
Now that a means of evaluating the suitability of risk
management methodologies existed through the utilization of
metrics, the method was augmented. To gain an appreciation of
their validity, Garrabrants and Ellis applied their metrics to
four sample, intuitively understandable methods of risk
analysis. The four methods included: Annual Loss Expectancy
(ALE), checklist, scenario, and questionnaire.
Using this approach, intuitive predictions were made
for each of the criteria. The purpose of analyzing their
results in the context of their predictions was to provide an
approximation of the usefulness and integrity of the metrics.
In essence, this process confirmed the metrics evaluation
technique by providing an acceptable, standardized measurement
of a methodology's attributes upon which to base a more
sophisticated comparison of risk management tools.
The significance of the metric evaluation is in its
application to hybrid methodologies . Hybrid methodologies are
representative of the majority of tools that are currently
available to computer security risk managers. The strength of
the metrics evaluation technique was demonstrated by
evaluating and comparing a small sample of four hybrid tools.
2. Performance of the Metrics
The evaluation results were focused on three different
perspectives. These perspectives consisted of examining the
13
results of each tool separately, examining the results of each
tool in comparison to each other, and finally, examining the
results by comparing the suitability index of each tool.
D. CONCLUSION
Garrabrants and Ellis established a standardized set of
metrics in a structured relationship that may be used to
evaluate risk management methodologies and tools for their
suitability in a given organizational situation. The metrics
were successfully applied to four computer security risk
management methodologies to develop an informal validation.
The metrics were also used to evaluate four hybrid computer
security risk management tools as a test and demonstration of
the multiple criteria evaluation method. Its versatility was
exemplified by the successful application to dissimilar tools.
Several suggestions for extension of the concepts developed in
their research were provided to guide future research.
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III. THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a theory for
modeling unstructured problems in the economic, social, and
management sciences. AHP was developed by Thomas L. Saaty of
the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (Saaty, 1980).
AHP models a decision process as a hierarchy or a system of
stratified layers, with the top layer being the ultimate goal
or decision that needs to be made, and each succeeding layer
being the criteria, subcriteria, subsubcriteria, etc. of the
hierarchy. Finally, the leaf nodes represent the alternatives
of the decision process. A pairwise comparison is made on
each level of the decision tree to determine the importance of
criteria and subcriteria, as well as the preference of the
alternatives with respect to these criteria.
AHP is designed to consider as many relevant facts and
ideas as possible to assist managers who have difficult
decisions. When making these difficult decisions, managers
normally consider the two or three major elements of a complex
decision. Quite often other elements which play an integral
role in the decision process may not be able to be considered.
The AHP process helps to alleviate this oversight.
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Pairwise comparison in AHP is more advantageous than the
process of assigning weights. When assigning weights, all
criteria are considered together with the most important
criteria assigned the highest weight. This weighting process
is used in assigning weights for all the succeeding ranked
criteria. In pairwise comparison, each criterion is compared
against each and every criterion to determine which criteria
is most important of the two and by how much. The AHP process
automatically calculates the weights for each criteria.
Once the hierarchy is established it may easily be
modified. The manager does not have to start from scratch.
New branches may be added to the hierarchy, and the
comparisons remade. If a branch in the hierarchy attains a
higher level of importance, the pairwise comparisons may be
reevaluated with a bigger weight assigned by the process to
that branch.
B. THE AHP PROCESS
The first step in setting up the AHP is to construct the
hierarchy. Hierarchies are developed by the decision maker by
establishing the necessary criteria to be considered. The
hierarchy may be established from the top down or the bottom
up. When a level becomes too complex or may not be readily
compared, the element of that level may be broken down into
newer lower levels, with finer distinctions. Even after this
hierarchical development, modifications may be made by adding
16
new nodes (e.g., criteria, subcriteria, alternatives) to the
decision process model.
The top level of a hierarchy is called the focus or the
broad overall objective. The second layer represents the
major criteria used in making the decision. Subsequent layers
are subcriteria that further explain the major criteria. The
leaves or bottom nodes of the tree are the alternatives from
which the decision maker wants to select in order to
accomplish the objective of the decision problem. Each layer
may have numerous elements, although Saaty states that five to
nine is an appropriate amount.
Figure 1 is a simple example of a hierarchy. The focus or
the overall objective of the hierarchy is to select the best
job. The second layer consists of the criteria used in making
a decision. For this example, they include wage, location,
and potential . The third and final layer in this example
represents the alternatives available to the decision maker.
In this example, they are IBM, APPLE, and NCR. Changes may
readily be made to the hierarchy by adding new alternatives,
such as Compaq, or by adding, deleting, or changing factors to
be used in the determination of the job to be selected. For
example, benefits could be substituted for potential in the
hierarchy. The process of selecting a job for decision making
may require a complex hierarchy. Every possible element
relevant to the selection process should be included in the
17









APPLE NCR IBM APPLE NCR
Figure 1. Select a Job Hierarchy
The second step in AHP consists of establishing or setting
priorities among the elements of the hierarchy. The setting
of priorities is established by pairwise comparisons within
each layer of the hierarchy. Each comparison in the hierarchy
is assigned a number from one to nine, with one being the
items are of equal importance and nine being the one element
having absolute importance over the other. The judgement of
the ranking and importance of the items is at the discretion
of the individual performing the comparison. Other values are
dispersed between those two extremes. Pairwise comparisons
may also be made using number or language (letters or verbal)
assignments, depending on the preference of the user. Terms
such as weakly more important, strongly more important, or
absolutely more important may assist in the development of
18
complex pairwise comparisons. Table 3 shows the complete
breakdown of the pairwise comparison criteria for AHP.
Comparisons of elements within a hierarchy may be made by
placing the results into a matrix. The matrix format is based
upon the number of elements in the hierarchy. The matrix of
the example of Figure 1 is a three by three matrix, as shown
in Table 4. An important question when making pairwise
comparisons is:
How much more strongly does this element . . . posses - or
contribute to, dominate, influence, satisfy, or benefit -
the property than does the element with which it is being
compared? (Saaty, 1982, page 77)
The individual uses his judgment, knowledge, or his
awareness of the situation to assign these values. The first
comparison in Table 4 is made between wage and location. In
this particular example, wage is assumed to be weakly more
important than location, and therefore, a value of three was
assigned, as indicated in Table 3. The reverse of this
comparison, i.e. location to wage, has a reciprocal value of
the wage to location comparison weight, or 1/3. The element
in the left hand column of the matrix is always compared to
the element in the top row of the matrix. The intensities are
determined by the decision maker, through pairwise comparison,
judgment, knowledge, or his particular awareness of a given
situation. Wage has been demonstrated to be strongly favored
to slightly dominant when compared to potential. Thus a
19
TABLE 3. THE PAIRWISE COMPARISON SCALE (Saaty, Decision
Making for Leaders, page 78)
Intensity of Definition Explanation
Importance
1 Equal importance of Two elements
both elements contribute equally to
the property
3 Weak importance of Experience and
both element over judgment slightly
another favor one element
over another
5 Essential or strong Experience and
importance of one judgment strongly
element over favor one element
another over another
7 Demonstrate An element is
importance of one strongly favored and
element over its dominance is
another demonstrated in
practice
9 Absolute importance The evidence favoring
of one element over one element over
another another is of the
highest possible
order of affirmation
2,4,6,8 Intermediate values Compromise is needed
between two between two judgments
adjacent judgments
Reciprocals If activity i has
one of the
preceding numbers
assigned to it when
compared with





figure of six is assigned, and the reciprocal potential to
wage is assigned a 1/6. The complete matrix is shown in Table
4.






Wage 1 3 6
Location 1/3 1 3
Potential 1/6 1/3 1
The next step, termed synthesis (Saaty, 1982) is to set
the overall priorities for a decision problem. Synthesis is
the pulling together of all the values and arriving at one
number to indicate the priority of that element. Table 5
illustrates this step in the synthesis of results of Select a
Job Model. The columns of the matrix are totaled, and each
entry in the column is then divided by the total of that
column to obtain a normalized matrix, as shown in Table 6.
This process allows comparison among the elements.
The average of each row is then computed by taking the sum
of each row and dividing this sum by the number of entries in
that row, as shown in Table 7. This gives the percentage of
the overall priority for each element.
In this particular example, the wage criterion is the
element which will have the largest impact on the decision on
which job to take, as it is has the highest value.
21
An important item to consider is the consistency of the
matrix derived through pairwise comparisons. An inconsistency
could be introduced if, for example, an individual prefers the
IBM job over the Apple job, the Apple job over the NCR job,
but the NCR job over the IBM job. The overall consistency of
the pairwise comparison matrix can be computed by means of an
inconsistency ratio. The inconsistency ratio does not need to
be exactly zero. If the value obtained is under 10%, then the
pairwise comparison matrix is considered to be consistent. If
the ratio is over 10%, then the pairwise comparisons are
considered to be inconsistent and should be reevaluated.
TABLE 5. SYNTHESIS OF SELECT A JOB
Element Wage Location Potential
Wage 1 3 6
Location 1/3 1 3
Potential 1/6 1/3 1
1.5 4.33 10
J
TABLE 6. NORMALIZED MATRIX OF SELECT A JOB
Element Wage Location Potential
Wage .67 .69 .6
Location .22 .23 .3
Potential .11 .08 .1
22
TABLE 7. OVERALL PRIORITIES FOR SELECT A JOB
Element Wage Location Potential
Wage .67 .69 .6 =1.96/3 = .65
Location .22 .23 .3 =0.75/3 = .25
Potential .11 .08 .1 =0.29/3 = .10
Consider the scenario shown in Table 8. In this scenario,
wage is weakly more important than location and potential.
Location is weakly more important than potential. The
percentage of overall relative priorities is determined and
presented in Table 9.
TABLE 8. MATRIX FOR INCONSISTENCY RATIO CALCULATION
Element Wage Location Potential
Wage 1 3 3
Location 1/3 1 3




To determine if an inconsistency has been introduced into
the decision process, each column value is multiplied by the
relative priority for that criterion, i.e., the wage column
with the wage priority of .57. The entries in each row are
then totaled as shown in Table 10. Each row sum is divided by
its corresponding relative priority as shown in Table 11.
23
TABLE 9. PRIORITIES FOR INCONSISTENCY RATIO CALCULATION




Wage 1 3 3 1.72 1.72 =
.57
Location 1/3 1 3 0.86 0.86/3 =
.29
Potential 1/3 1/3 1 0.42 0.42/3 =
.14








Wage .57 .87 .42 1.86
Location .19 .29 .42 0.90
Potential .19 .10 .43 0.43
TABLE 11. INCONSISTENCY RATIO CALCULATIONS
Wage 1.86 divided by 0.57 = 3.26
Location 0.90 divided by 0.29 = 3.10
Potential 0.43 divided by 0.14 = 3.07
The results of this division are summed then divided by
the number of elements in the matrix to obtain the average.
From this average the number of elements are subtracted and
the result is divided by two. This is called the consistency
index (CI) (Saaty, 1982). The CI in this example is 0.07.
The inconsistency ratio is obtained by dividing the CI by an
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average consistency, based on the number of criteria in the
matrixes. The average consistency value for a matrix of three
criteria is 0.58 (Saaty, 1982). The inconsistency ratio for
Select a Job is .12 or 12%, which is above 10%, indicating an
inconsistency in the pairwise comparisons. The pairwise
comparisons should be reevaluated.
C. CONCLUSION
By using AHP, an individual may consider many more
elements than is usually possible in the normal human decision
thought process. An individual thought process can generally
consider two to three factors, but with AHP, any number of
factors can be considered. Even trivial elements which could
have an impact upon the decision maker may be considered.
Using a pairwise comparison, more accurate weights are
calculated for the criteria, resulting in a more refined
decision.
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTS USING THE ANALYTIC HIERARCHY
PROCESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to adapt the CERTS method
to the AHP process, and to develop a decision support system
(DSS) to assist organizations in the selection of a risk
management methodology or tool to suit their needs.
The CERTS technique is useful to an organization in the
selection of a risk management package. However, this
technique is hard to apply in its present form. Users must
analyze a large number of questionnaires, then perform the
necessary computations manually to determine the best
available package. CERTS does not have the ability to
differentiate strengths and weaknesses of certain metrics, as
it makes boolean determinations only. Weights may not be
assigned to these criteria to further refine the solution to
address the priority needs of the organization. The
application of CERTS is also tedious and time consuming for
the user. CERTS application requires that the user become
thoroughly familiar with each risk management package being
analyzed.
The AHP process, however, assists in overcoming these
problems. The process is completely automated, decreasing the
amount of time required to fill out questionnaires with the
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calculations being done automatically. The pairwise
comparisons of AHP allow the assignment of weights to
criteria, attributes and metrics. The user will not have to
become intimately familiar with each package as weights could
be assigned to each package in the leaf nodes.
The DSS selected to incorporate CERTS into AHP was Expert
Choice, developed by Expert Choice, Incorporated of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Expert Choice offers the capability
of a hierarchy up to six levels deep, with up to seven
subnodes for each node of the hierarchy. Pairwise comparisons
may be made at each level. Expert Choice can therefore
support a decision process with thousands of input criteria.
B. IMPLEMENTATION OF CERTS USING AHP
The CERTS methodology is readily adaptable for
implementation using AHP. The concepts of criteria,
attribute, and metric in CERTS map nicely into the concepts of
criteria, subcriteria, and subsubcriteria in AHP. This is
explained in the following paragraphs.
The objective of selecting the best risk management
package becomes the top layer or goal of the AHP hierarchy.
The CERTS criteria level becomes the second layer of the
hierarchy. These are the main decision elements of the DSS
and are shown in Figure 2. The third level of the hierarchy
contains the attributes that are used to refine the criteria.
These attributes correspond to the subcriteria of the AHP
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method. The fourth level of the hierarchy contains the
metrics that are used to further define the attributes. These
metrics expressed as questions in CERTS were modified and
expressed as subsubcriteria in the AHP hierarchy. These
subsubcriteria could be used in pairwise comparison, and,
therefore, assigned weights. For example, the boolean metric
for the subcriteria reliability, "Does the process provide a
mechanism to reduce the introduction of personal bias?" is
transformed into the subsubcriteria of "reducing the
introduction of personal bias." Then "reducing the
introduction of personal bias" may be compared with other
subsubcriteria and assigned a weight. Each criteria is
discussed in detail in the sections below. Finally, the leaf
nodes of the hierarchy contains the alternative risk
management tools from which the most appropriate package will
be selected. Incorporating the alternatives in the hierarchy
is explained in Section C.








Figure 2. Criteria of Risk Management Package Hierarchy
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1. Consistency
Consistency relates to the ability to duplicate the
results consistently throughout the process. Consistency has
subcriteria of reliability and consistent terminology.
Reliability is concerned with a package's objectivity or the
reduction of subjectivity in the risk management process. The
subcriteria of consistent terminology relates to the ability
of the package to use the same terminology throughout the
entire risk management program. The subcriteria and
subsubcriteria for consistency are listed in Template 1 of
Appendix A.
2. User Interface
User interface is the ability and knowledge needed by
the user to understand the complete system, as well as the
level of support provided by the vendor of the system. The
criteria of user interface is broken down into subcriteria of
error handling, simplicity, ease of use, understandability
,
and support. Error handling is concerned with the ability of
the program to identify input errors. Simplicity deals with
the outward appearance of the package, e.g., does it appear
easy for the user to understand the process. The ease of use
subcriteria measures how well structured and logically
sequential the process is. Understandability relates to the
ability of comprehending the underlying premise that supports
the package methodology. Support is concerned with the
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assistance provided by the program vendor. The subcriteria
and subsubcriteria for user interface are listed in Template
2 of Appendix A.
3. Adaptability
Adaptability relates to the ability to apply the
method to various types of computer systems, and whether it
may be easily updated. Computer systems run the gamut from
personal computer to mainframe computer to a complex
distributed network. Adaptability has the subcriteria of
portability and modif iability . Portability is concerned with
the ability to use the product across various computer systems
and configurations. Modif iability is the ability to apply
different alternatives or options to the process to determine
the effect upon the outputs. The subcriteria and
subsubcriteria for adaptability are detailed in Template 3 of
Appendix A.
4. Feasibility
Feasibility is concerned with the cost and amount of
effort required by the organization to fulfill the information
requirements and input for the risk management package.
Subcriteria for feasibility are availability, practicality and
scope. Availability subcriteria distinguishes between
internal and external data needed by the system, and the ease
by which that data may be obtained. Concern with the
economics of gathering the required data is covered by the
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subcriteria of practicality. Scope deals with the broadness
of the system to cover all necessary items contained in the
organization's information. Template 4 of Appendix A presents
the subcriteria and subsubcriteria for feasibility.
5. Completeness
Completeness is concerned with the coverage of all
risk management areas of concern to the satisfaction of the
user. Scope, elements, and element attributes are the
subcriteria for completeness. Scope, which is duplicated in
other criteria, is concerned here with the level of detailed
analysis that is done throughout the various aspects of the
organization. Elements deal with the components that operate
to determine the risks of a system. Subcriteria of
completeness are concerned with the outcomes or consequences
that could occur from the elements attributes. The
subcriteria and subsubcriteria of the completeness subcriteria
are shown in Template 5 of Appendix A.
6. Validity
The validity criteria measures the package's ability
to represent reality of desired legitimate situations. The
subcriteria for validity are relevancy, scope, and
practicality. Relevancy means that results of the process are
meaningful to the organization. Scope is used in the context
of validity of the process on all the various aspects of the
organization. Practicality is repeated again from the
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feasibility criteria, but deals with the validity of the data
gathered by the process. Template 6 of Appendix A displays
the criteria and subsubcriteria of the validity criteria.
7. Credibility
The last criteria, credibility, deals with whether the
conclusions arrived at by the package are acceptable by the
organization. The subcriteria of credibility are
intuitiveness and reliability. Intuitiveness shows whether
the results will instill and maintain the confidence of the
user organization. The ability to obtain repeatable results
from the package determines the reliability. Template 7 of
Appendix A exhibits the subcriteria and subsubcriteria for the
credibility criteria.
Appendix B shows the output from Expert Choice
implementing CERTS.
C. INCORPORATING ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIERARCHY
1. Alternative Risk Management Packages
The alternative risk management packages were selected
in conjunction with inputs from the Department of Commerce's
National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) . The
risk management packages for this study were selected from
data obtained from the sampling and extensive testing of
numerous risk management packages at NIST's Risk Management
Laboratory. The packages that were selected were LAVA,
developed by Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New
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Mexico; BDSS, developed by Ozier, Perry and Associates, San
Francisco, California; and RISKWATCH, developed by Expert
Systems Software, Incorporated, Long Beach, California. These
packages became the leaf nodes of the AHP hierarchy.
The subsubcriteria in the lower level of the Decision
Support System, (listed in Templates 1 through 7 of Appendix
A) were applied to the three packages. The ability of each
risk management package to meet the subsubcriteria was
measured by the authors and NIST personnel's qualitative
opinions
.
2. Assigning Weights to the Alternatives
Using pairwise comparison, each risk management
package was assigned a weight that indicates its preference
with respect to each subsubcriteria. If two packages were
deemed equal in ability by the authors, then the DSS assigned
equal weights to these packages. For example, it was found
that in Template 1 of Appendix A, the subsubcriteria
"establishing standard language" of the subcriteria consistent
terminology, of the consistency criteria, was addressed
equally by all three packages (LAVA, BDSS, and RISKWATCH).
Therefore, pairwise comparisons assigned equal weights to each
package. This is shown in Table 12.
Pairwise comparisons were made for all subsubcriteria
for the DSS. As described in Chapter II, Table 1, comparisons
may be made by numerical, or verbal methods. In addition, DSS
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offers a graphical means of presenting the pairwise comparison
in the form of a pie graph. An example of weights resulting
from a pairwise comparison is shown in Table 13 for the
criteria "consistency," the subcriteria "reliability," and for
the subsubcriteria "reducing the introduction of personal
bias." Verbal comparisons were made of the alternative risk
management packages such that LAVA was deemed to be moderately
more important than BDSS and equal to moderately more
important than RISKWATCH, while RISKWATCH was deemed to be
equal to moderately more important than BDSS. Appendix C
shows all pairwise comparison results for the alternatives in
regard to the subsubcriteria.
TABLE 12. EQUALITY IN PAIRWISE COMPARISONS
Criteria: Consistency
Subcriteria: Consistent Terminology
Subsubcriteria: Establishing Standard Language




The inconsistency ratio is automatically calculated by
the DSS for each set of assigned weights. The inconsistency
ratios were under 10% for all pairwise comparisons of the risk
management packages. The comparisons were thus deemed to be
free of inconsistencies.
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In the next chapter we apply the developed DSS to
three hypothetical case studies.




Reduces the Introduction of Personal Bias





V. APPLICATION OF THE DSS TO CASE STUDIES
A. INTRODUCTION
In Chapter IV, the CERTS methodology was applied to the
AHP method to develop the CERTS Decision Support System (DSS).
This DSS may then be used by an analyst to determine the best
risk management package for a particular computer system site
or situation. This chapter demonstrates the application of
the DSS to three different hypothetical case scenarios. These
case studies were provided by NIST and further developed by
the authors.
1. Application of CERTS DSS
The choice of a suitable risk management package
depends upon the experience of the analyst and how well he
tailors the organizational requirements to the evaluation.
The CERTS DSS could be an invaluable tool in assisting the
analyst in determining the best package to use. For the
purpose of this thesis, CERTS DSS includes three risk
management packages. Additional packages could be
incorporated easily in the AHP hierarchy using the approach
detailed in the previous chapter.
The procedure to apply the CERTS DSS for each case is
simple, systematic, and straightforward. Initially, the
analyst conducts pairwise comparisons of the seven criteria at
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the first level of the DSS, according to the organization's
particular needs. Consequently, the system assigns weights to
the various criteria. The analyst may refine the selection
process by further conducting pairwise comparisons of the
subcriteria and subsubcriteria of each criteria in the
hierarchy.
Upon the completion of each level of pairwise
comparisons, the system calculates an inconsistency factor.
If the factor is over 10%, then some type of inconsistency
exists. The pairwise comparisons should then be reviewed and
reconsidered until the inconsistency ratio is below 10%. Once
the weights have been assigned, the synthesis is conducted to
derive the overall results. The program calculates an overall
weight for each risk management package based on the pairwise
comparisons made by the analysts. The program with the
highest weight is, therefore, the most suitable for the
organizational situation.
2. Disclaimer for Case Scenarios
The case scenarios presented are modeled after test
cases provided by the Risk Management Laboratory at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology. The
information provided by the cases should not be construed to
represent actual circumstances, conditions, or procedures of
any kind that may exist in any actual site. The cases were
developed and designed to provide as realistic and consistent
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input as possible to the CERTS DSS for the evaluation of the
risk management packages.
B. CASE SCENARIO DESCRIPTIONS
1. Case Scenario One: Distributed Wide Area Network
(WAN)
System X is a nationwide distributed office automation
and work/project tracking system. The system provides word
processing, electronic mail, spreadsheets, databases, and
graphics. In addition to performing its network functions,
the database serves as a management information system.
This information system provides management with
computer listings of the daily and overall functions of each
office. All work projects are tracked on the database.
Tracking is required for the allocation and purchase of
resources. The workload is primarily in the format of word
processing documents. Databases and spreadsheets are used to
support this function.
a. Physical Environment
The system is distributed over nine sites. The
headquarters (HQ) is located in a Northeastern city, with
other sites spread around the U.S. at field centers (FCs). At
HQ, the system is linked via two leased lines to the mainframe
complex. Each of the FCs' computers is linked into its center
LAN. All the sites are connected via a network that runs on
the agency's telecommunications system using a public packet
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switching service. Backup service at the HQ minicomputer is
provided for the dial-up access. Access to the HQ mainframe
is through a packet-switched network to the HQ minicomputer.
The minicomputer functions as a file and print server for the
office.
b. Equipment
The dollar value of equipment is as follows:
200 micros @ $3,000 $600,000
8 small minicomputers @ $75,000 600,000
1 medium minicomputer @ $200,000 200,000
25 laptops @ $2,000 50,000
misc. printers, modems, etc. 100 ,000
TOTAL $1,550,000
Equipment used but not owned include: (by
contractor) packet-switched network; leased lines between HQ
mini and mainframe computers; and internal networks of various
types at the different sites. The communications equipment is
five years old.
c. Personnel
All personnel receive critical-sensitive background
checks before employment. A few administrative personnel
receive national agency checks (NAC). The management has no
policy on separation of duties.
There is no computer security training. However,
workers are informed of their physical security
responsibilities, which include: displaying their picture
badge at all times; challenging any person not wearing a badge
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for whose activity or presence appears questionable; reporting
the loss or misuse of a badge; and surrendering a badge when
it is no longer needed. A computer security person has been
assigned by management to track this function.
There are 300 people at HQ. Each of the FCs have
between 100 and 150 people. Resource protection measures at
all sites include: fraud, waste, and abuse education of
personnel; marking of all equipment; maintaining an active
inventory of all hardware and software; and making personnel
responsible for protection of government property. There are
attractive features (e.g., full color printing) in the system,
but no games are allowed. Staff working outside normal hours
are unsupervised.
d. Data Environment
One database is run on the HQ mainframe computer
and several are run on the HQ minicomputer. Access to the HQ
mainframe computer is accomplished via a packet-switched
network, which allows transmission from the HQ minicomputer to
the mainframe computer over two leased lines. Backups are
made nightly of the HQ minicomputer and mainframe computer;
these tapes are stored off -site on a weekly basis. Backups of
the PCs are made by individual staff members.
The data is highly sensitive. Accuracy and
timeliness of the data is required for monthly and semiannual
reporting. Inaccurate data would result in poor planning and
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mismanagement of resources. Some of the data requires
stringent confidentiality protection due to privacy laws.
Disclosure of this data would result in mission failure,
dollar loss to the agency, possible lawsuits, and
embarrassment to the organization. The disclosure, however,
would not seriously affect the agency mission. Losses for
disclosure could be $500,000 to $1 million, excluding the cost
of lawsuits. Losses for mismanagement could be quite costly.
e. Operating Systems
The system cannot be described as 'hacker
friendly'; there is a warning screen when signing onto the HQ
mini- and mainframe computers. The communications equipment
has not been specially adapted for any site. Remote site
dial-up users accessing the system receive full processing
capability. It is not easy to 'crash' the applications
software and break into the operating system or other
applications. On the other hand, untested software from
vendors for trial processing is often allowed. This is a
potential for vulnerability, since no virus detection software
is available on the system.
The mini- and mainframe computers have access
control with passwords, which allow for three tries before
locking the user ID. Passwords are required to be changed
every 90 days. Passwords on minicomputers are four characters
long; passwords on mainframe computer are six to eight
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characters long. Passwords for both the mini- and mainframe
computers are: suppressed automatically during entry;
intentionally related to the user's identity, history, or
environment; replaced with a new password when forgotten; and
generated by the user. Management policy prohibits the use of
group passwords. Passwords and user IDs are removed from the
minicomputers promptly when an employee leaves. There is no
timeout on unused accounts.
Loss of availability of the system for short
periods (one day) is not a major problem. The loss of the
large minicomputer for a day, the loss of network, the
mainframe computer, or the small minicomputer for more than
seven days would significantly affect productivity. This time
loss could result in missed mandated monthly and semiannual
deadlines. Approximate loss of productivity is $500,000 per
week. The loss of the mainframe computer for a week or more
or the loss of the network at a critical reporting time would
result in failure to meet legislated or administrative
deadlines. While this would produce no dollar loss, goodwill
would be lost and future budget considerations would suffer.
The loss of the FCs or HQ for more than a week would be
disastrous to the agency. The monetary cost would be the
equipment cost plus loss of productivity at $200,000 per week
per site.
Audit and variance detection are implemented. The
audit trail is read often and handled in a timely manner. A
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security person checks all unsuccessful logins and system
bugs. Although technical controls consist of
authorization/access control, audit trail mechanisms, an
encryption package, error checking/correcting protocols, and
user ID and authentication, there is no form of message
authentication code (MACing) on this system.
One case of deliberate misuse of resources by
authorized staff last year was detected at one of the FCs
.
The average level of staff experience with the system is more
than two years. The turnover in staff averages 15% per year.
The approximate number of non-staff personnel (e.g., visitors,
contractors, maintenance) entering the headquarters or
supporting facilities each day is 50.
f. Management Philosophy and Concerns
Top management, along with selected members of a
risk management assessment team, convened to determine their
major concerns in the selection of a risk management tool with
the intention of using the CERTS DSS. The committee used the
pairwise comparison of the DSS to establish their priorities
for the criteria. Table 14 shows the rankings and summarizes
the weights assigned to the criteria by the DSS. As Table 14
indicates, user interface was deemed to be the most important
criteria in selecting a risk management package. This was
followed by adaptability, consistency, credibility, validity,
feasibility, and completeness, respectively.
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Since System X is a nationwide network and requires
that each site apply the risk management application, user
interface is a top priority consideration. With nine sites
spread across the United States, importance is stressed on
ease of use, comprehension, and developer support. The
distance between sites has generated risk management concerns
TABLE 14 DISTRIBUTED WAN
Ranking Criteria DSS Assigned Weight







in the areas of input preparation, execution of the process,
and the interpretation of output. These concerns represent
the interface and relationships between the analyst and the
process. The users of the risk package are not required to
comprehend all features of the process, but do need to
understand what decisions are expected of them. A process
that is well structured and logically sequential is critical
to the ease-of-use aspect. Developer support must include
complete and extensive documentation, 24 hour phone support,
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and comprehensive on-site training. Table 15 provides the
ranking and the DSS assigned weights for the user interface
subcriteria.
Given this particular system configuration,
adaptability is high on the list of management concerns. The
search is for a package or tool that may be applied to a
variety of computer system configurations. Portability is of
utmost importance when dealing with a highly distributed
environment, such as presented in this case. The package must
apply to a changing environment, as the possibility of adding
or deleting field sites is high. This change may trigger a
need to modify the tool to assist the analyst in examining
alternatives or options. Table 16 summarizes the rankings and
the DSS assigned weights for the adaptability subcriteria.
TABLE 15. USER INTERFACE
Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight




5 Error Handling .172
Standardization for risk management is required
across the entire network. Therefore, the results obtained
from the risk management package for each site should not be
significantly different. Consistency implies the ability to
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TABLE 16. ADAPTABILITY
Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight
1 Portability .570
2 Modif iability .430
duplicate the results of the process. A key component of
consistency is reliability. Reliability reduces the wide
amount of variance that could occur as a result of personal
biases. The more the process reduces biases in the analysis
at each site, the more consistent the results will be between
the analysis teams at each site. Table 17 depicts the
rankings and weights assigned by the DSS for the consistency
subcriteria.
TABLE 17. CONSISTENCY
Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight
1 Reliability .560
2 Consistent Terminology .440
The data used over the WAN is highly sensitive.
Losses for disclosure could run up to one million dollars.
Consequently, the credibility aspect of the package is
essential to the merit of the output. The reliability of the
risk management package is also essential to its credibility.
With the possibility of high monetary losses, the same results
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must occur when the same data is used on different occasions.
Table 18 shows the ranking for the credibility subcriteria.
The credibility of a risk management package is
closely followed by the validity aspect of that package.
Management wants to avoid the possibility of obtaining
irrelevant conclusions or results. These results must be
meaningful to the system. The process should also provide
categories of solutions rather than specific recommendations.










The feasibility of obtaining the data is less
important as each site does its own application. Completeness
was also as a minor concern of risk management in this case.
Therefore, the subcriteria within each of these criteria were
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considered of equal importance. Tables 20 and 21 display the
rankings and the weights assigned by the DSS for the
feasibility and completeness subcriteria, respectively.
The CERTS DSS selected RISKWATCH as the best risk
management package for the Distributed Wide Area Network (WAN)
Scenario. The detailed results are shown in Appendix D,
Templates 1 through 3.
TABLE 20. FEASIBILITY









One of the major advantages of the CERTS DSS is
that you need not discard the whole framework if you find that
you overlooked something in formulating the priorities of the
criteria. The system is designed to show the sensitivity of
each criteria to the alternatives. For example, if management
desired to place more emphasis on consistency, for the above
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case, the CERTS DSS would select LAVA as the best risk
management tool for the Distributed Wide Area Network (WAN).
The sensitivity analysis is illustrated in Appendix D,
Template 4.
2. Case Scenario Two: Under Development System - Biomed
The Biomed system is a new system, currently being
developed, that is designed to track biomedical research,
including animal research. Applications will be developed to
track and record results of experiments and will be used to
write proposals and reports. The software will include
relational and hierarchial database packages, word processing,
and graphics packages. These packages will share data when
creating reports and presentations.
a. Physical Environment
The Biomed system is currently under development
and will be located in a single tenant government building in
suburban Washington. The building has no fence and is
accessible from the street. Site access is controlled by
picture ID badges and 24 hour-a-day guards. Visitors with
proper identification are allowed unescorted into the
facility.
The site has a staff of 1,700. The Biomed system
will be used by 100 local and 50 remote users. Approximately
75 non-staff personnel (e.g., visitors, contractors,
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maintenance) enter the site each day. The turnover in staff
averages 8% per year.
Each lab and office has a sprinkler system, which
is part of the building system. All labs have hand-held fire
extinguishers, but offices do not. All lab personnel have
been trained in the extinguishers' use. No smoking is allowed
in the building. Food and drink are discouraged, but not
prohibited. Inflammable materials (e.g., solvents) are stored
and processed at the site. Three fires have occurred in the
labs within the last two years.
The Biomed system will be in an existing computer
room with raised flooring, environmental control, heat
detectors, drains, and fire suppression. The room is in the
basement with no windows. Once a month, the floor beneath the
raised floor is cleaned by a special crew.
b. Equipment
Based upon the functional needs and expected usage,
a minicomputer or small mainframe computer will be procured.
The expected value of minicomputer and operating system is
$150,000. Total cost of the application software is estimated
at $700,000. Existing PCs will be used to access the system.
c. Personnel
The agency provides national agency checks (NACs)
for all employees. There is no computer security training.
However, personnel are aware of their physical security
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responsibilities, including: displaying the badge at all
times; reporting the loss or misuse of a badge; and
surrendering a badge no longer needed. Responsibility for
computer security of the Biomed system will be assigned by
management. Staff working outside normal hours are
unsupervised.
d. Data Environment
The data requires strong integrity protection to
ensure that published experiment results are correct.
Availability is required for maximizing productivity. Brief
down times will be inconvenient but not critical. The data is
time-sensitive and is not made public until experiments and
analysis are complete to avoid improper interpretation of
results.
e. Operating Systems
On-site Biomed system users will access it through
a LAN. The proposed method for remote users is through dial-
in ports; 5 ports are anticipated. There are no dial-up
communication lines now in place. The communications
equipment will not be specially adapted.
f. Administration
The Animal Rights groups are an active threat.
These groups have demonstrated at the site, and it is presumed
they have skilled computer operators within the group. They
have conducted raids against the site, destroying property and
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releasing animals. City police are used during
demonstrations. Forced entry into the building may be
accomplished, however, forced access into the internal offices
and labs is difficult.
As the Biomed system is under development, there
are no operational or technical controls currently in place.
There has been no emergency, backup, or contingency planning
done for the proposed Biomed system. Backup is available for
air conditioning and power. There will be attractive features
(e.g., full color printing) available in the Biomed system,
and games will also be on the system.
If the Biomed system is down for 24 hours, there
will be no problem. If the Biomed system is down for 7 days
or more, there will be a loss of productivity of $40,000 per
day. Two weeks is the maximum acceptable downtime for this
system. After that, a loss of confidence will occur and could
cause possible loss of future funding.
Since the data is used for biomedical research,
compromises may be (but are not necessarily) related to a
possible loss of human life through extended research time or
improper authorization for human experimentation. Compromise
could include: damage through error; unauthorized disclosure
or modification; and unavailability of the Biomed system.
There would be no monetary impacts (such as law suits), but
compromise could result in failure to accomplish the agency
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mission, improper interpretation of results, or loss of public
confidence and future funding.
The Office of Scientific Integrity has a strong
policy on maintaining the integrity of scientific projects.
Management allows group data passwords only if they are known
by authorized users. Management has in-place resource
protection measures which include: marking of all equipment;
maintaining an active inventory of all hardware and software;
and making personnel responsible for protection of government
property. Despite this, there have been three cases of
deliberate misuse of resources by authorized staff in the last
year. The staff is trained in emergency procedures which
include: evacuation procedures; CPR training; first-aid kits
on each floor; and health facilities at each site. The Biomed
system procedures will be written after the system is procured
and the applications are developed.
g. Management Philosophy and Concerns
During the design phase of the Biomed system, an
automated data processing security branch was developed to
address and direct all security issues associated with the
project. Top management envisioned this branch as a key
contributor to the development of the new system. To fulfill
this requirement, the branch established a risk management
team of technical, administrative, management, and programming
experts. The team's initial mission was to select a risk
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management package to assist in system development. The CERTS
DSS was used to select this package, and pairwise comparisons
were made for all the criteria. For example, completeness was
deemed to be more important, in varying degrees, than any
other criteria. The rankings and DSS assigned weights for
pairwise compared criteria are summarized in Table 22.
Completeness was followed by credibility, consistency,
validity, user interface, adaptability, and feasibility,
respectively.
The team's primary concern in the choice of a risk
management package is to ensure completeness. The package
must take into consideration all relevant relationships and
system elements of risk management. Since the Biomed system
is a new, under development system, top management is also
concerned that the analysis considers all aspects of the
system. Desired elements of coverage could include assets,
threat agents, threat events, safeguards, vulnerabilities, and
outcomes. This array of information is regarded as critical
in the development of the DSS methodology and the satisfaction
of the needs of the organization. The management desires that
the relationships between the elements of risk are addressed
in areas such as local and remote users, known activist
threats, integrity of scientific projects, emergency
situations, backup situations, and contingency planning.
Table 23 displays the rankings and the DSS assigned weights
for the completeness subcriteria.
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Management tends to view the credibility of a
particular method or package with utmost importance when
involved with sensitive data. The process used has a
significant bearing on the acceptability of its conclusions.
The data produced in Biomedical research requires strong
integrity protection to ensure that the results are correct.
With the possibility of system compromises that could lead to
the loss of human life, it is imperative that the risk package
encompass all threats and vulnerabilities. The reliability of
the method provides credence to those interpreting the output.
If different results are returned using the same data on
different occasions, the method will hold little plausibility
for its users. Table 24 shows the rankings and the DSS
assigned weights for the credibility subcriteria.
TABLE 22. BIOMED SYSTEM














With the strong requirement for maximizing
productivity and ensuring that published results are correct,
consistency is the next criteria emphasized by management.
Scientific research provides an atmosphere of constant change
and various risks. When an analyst is evaluating these risks,
he has a tendency to make inferences based on what he
remembers hearing or observing. A key component of
consistency, reliability, furnishes support for the reduction
of subjectivity in the risk management process. Another
concern in this process is controlling differences in
interpretation. Interpretation is defined as the information
being asked for versus what the product represents. A uniform
set of terminology is a must between the analyst and the
process. Table 25 depicts the rankings and the DSS assigned
weights for the consistency subcriteria.
The validity of a package is exposed to the
numerous impacts that the risks impose on the data. Equal
concern was expressed for the subcriteria of validity. To
maintain relevancy of the results, it was felt that the
results of the package must therefore relate to significant
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TABLE 24. CREDIBILITY




Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Height
1 Reliability .550
2 Consistent Terminology .450
areas of need and also incorporate mandated security
requirements. The user of the package must be able to control
the level of detail being analyzed and must also be able to
consider all aspects of the system. Table 26 presents the
rankings and the DSS assigned weights for the validity
subcriteria.
TABLE 26. VALIDITY




User interface was a minor concern, based on the
experience and level of training of each member of the risk
management team. The subcriteria of ease of use and
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comprehension of underlying premises with methodology are a
plus for this criteria. The team requires 24-hour phone
support or a 1-800 number service. Table 27 provides the
rankings and the DSS assigned weights for the user interface
subcriteria. As the Biomed system procedures will be written
after the system is procured, adaptability and feasibility are
of less concern at the present time than other areas. Tables
28 and 29 summarize the rankings and the DSS assigned weights
for the adaptability and feasibility subcriteria.
TABLE 27. USER INTERFACE
Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight





4 Error Handling .097
5 Simplicity .062
The CERTS DSS selected BDSS as the best risk
management package for the Biomed scenario. The detailed
results are shown in Appendix E, Templates 1 through 3.
TABLE 28. ADAPTABILITY
Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight








As described in the first case, a sensitivity
analysis can be performed if your priorities for the criteria
change. If management decided they wanted a more portable
package, additional weight would be applied to the
adaptability criteria. With the newly assigned weight, the
CERTS DSS would select RISKWATCH as the best risk management
tool for the Biomed case. The sensitivity analysis is
illustrated in Appendix E, Template 4.
3. Case Scenario Three: Data Center
The ABC Corporate Data Center supports the North
American Operation, a subsidiary of United Corporation. The
North American Operation has 400 full-time employees and is
the fifth largest banking organization in the Northeast United
States. The data center is responsible for processing
checking accounts, savings deposits, loans, and savings
certificates. Additional responsibilities include maintaining
off-the-shelf personnel and management computer applications.
a. Physical Environment
Two buildings were converted for company use, ADP
and Administration. The buildings are next to one another,
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but not physically connected. The buildings are located in a
large Northeastern American city on an average city street.
A sidewalk runs along one side of each building. There is an
adequately lit employee parking lot. The possibility of an
earthquake in that area is low.
The ADP Building is a 20 year old warehouse and
houses the mainframe computer and the tape library.
Conversion improvements consist of: raised flooring to
accommodate cables and wiring; suspended acoustical tile
ceiling to absorb sound and hide the overhead plumbing; power
distribution upgrade; surge suppression; lighting; and air
conditioning and heating. There are no under floor water
detectors or temperature-humidity recording systems. The roof
is in good shape, despite its age. Recently, water stains
have been noticed in other parts of the building. The
concrete floor below the raised floor was last cleaned when
installed five years ago.
The Administration Building was originally
constructed as an ADP Center. Therefore, it is equipped with
adequate environmental systems (similar to those of the
current ADP building). When it was converted to its present
use, an overhead sprinkler system was added to conform to fire
codes. Neither building has an emergency backup generator.
The power is supplied solely by the local power company.
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b. Equipment
The Data Center contains an XYZ-3100 Mainframe with
six tape drives, 12 disk drives, and 3 on-line printers, all
located in the computer room of the ADP building. In
addition, 20 terminals are located in an uncontrolled area of
that building. These terminals are connected to the XYZ-3100
Mainframe via the data communication system. Despite a
constant workload, the system only operates at 60% capacity.
This low capacity is attributed to poor employee performance,
software failure, and unreliable equipment. The equipment
repairs are performed on a 'per incident* basis by a
contractor hired on that basis. No regular maintenance is
performed on the hardware. The Administration Building has
PCs, however, none of the PCs lock or are secured to the
furniture
.
The dollar value of equipment is as follows:
1 mainframe computer @ $350,000 $ 250,000
6 tape drives 10,000
12 disk drives 150,000
30 personal computers 200,000
1 communications controller 10,000
2 modems 5,000
4 multiplexers 4,000
Other (paper, disks, printers, etc.) 100 ,000
TOTAL value of equipment $ 829,000
c. Personnel
Background checks are not performed on new hires.
Only the 20 data entry clerks and 10 computer operators (of 50
employees) are considered essential to production operations.
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However, excessive use of sick leave and a high rate of
turnover is a problem with these essential employees.
Personnel shortage, the continuing need for overtime, and
excess sick leave adds to the backlog of work, which must be
made up at time-and-a-half rates. The loss of an operator or
clerk results in recruitment fees and training costs for
replacement personnel. The average level of experience for
the system staff is two years. The average percentage of
turnover in staff per year is 40%.
Mo formal form of computer security training exists
for personnel. The only existing training is for new data
entry clerks on the performance of their jobs. There are no
passwords for any system entry.
d. Data Environment
The Pay/Personnel and Financial /Management
application systems are off-the-shelf and maintained by
upgrades from the vendor. Company personnel trained on the
software can make quick patches when necessary. These systems
and data files constitute the critical work-load (80% of the
total) of the Center. The rest of the work is general
administration of the company, using standard business
software. Backups are made once a week. These backups are
stored in the tape library, with the original copy of the
software. Backups are kept for three weeks before being
recycled.
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Data sensitivity is primarily based on its
integrity requirement and is considered to be highly
sensitive. The potential for loss, due to fraud or error, is
high. The system controls 500 million dollars of
disbursements annually, as well as a payroll. The
availability of the system is required for operations and
employee productivity and has medium sensitivity, since it can
be accessed manually. A confidentiality requirement exists
for personnel data on the system. This data is classified as
medium sensitive due to the Privacy Act stipulations placed on
government contractors.
e. Operating Systems
The proprietary system software is supplied by the
hardware vendor and provides no controls to limit access to
software or data files. Copies of the system software may be
obtained from the vendor at no charge and made operational in
approximately eight hours. A standard operating procedure is
to obtain a clean copy of the operating system from the vendor
whenever the on-site OSS has become unusable. Whenever there
is a production stoppage, the problem is located, fixed, and
restarted at an appropriate point. Production problems are
attributed to bad code or patching. The OSS has audit
capabilities and that facility is occasionally used.
In the event of an extended system unavailability,
all data entry clerks and computer operators, as well as the
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other ADP personnel, manually perform the computer's critical
processing. All personnel are required to work an extended
shift (10 hours) if an extended system unavailability occurs.
Each hour of manual critical processing costs the company
$7,500.
The data communications system consists of one
communications controller and one modem located in the ADP
Building. These are connected by a single, underground line
to one modem and four multiplexers (one primary and three
secondary) located in an uncontrolled area of the
Administration Building. The communications equipment is five
years old. As with the ADP equipment, the repairs to the data
communications system are accomplished on a 'per incident'
basis by a contractor. There is no regular maintenance on the
communications system.
f. Administration
Security for the data is considered to be a low
priority item, primarily due to budget. Documentation of
operating and administrative procedures are located throughout
the Center, but not kept up-to-date. The Center works one
shift (eight hours) per day and normally generates $5,000 per
hour in revenue.
The system is 'hacker friendly' (e.g., no
passwords, no warning screen). It is not difficult to 'crash'
the network and enter the operating system, or other
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applications. The company relies on software packages from
the vendor to keep the system operational , and any enhancement
the vendor chooses to put on the system is accepted. Any
staff working outside normal hours have access to programming
and editing facilities. The staff works on the system
unsupervised. The organization does not rely on the
communications equipment, therefore, its failure is not likely
to result in complete stoppage. The network will continue to
function in a degraded mode.
The On-line Pay/Personnel system and
Financial /Management information system are processed in the
batch mode. All data entry is performed by data entry clerks.
Updates to the master Pay/Personnel files are usually
backlogged two to three days. All other data entry is often
backlogged two weeks. Because of backlog, ten (of 20) data
entry clerks and five (of ten) computer operators each work
two hours per day (ten hours/week) overtime. As a result,
computer operations are now scheduled for ten hours (eight
hours plus two hours overtime) daily. All employees receive
time-and-a-half for overtime work. Operating expenses
(utilities, etc.) incurred from overtime amounts to $3,000 per
hour.
g. Management Philosophy and Concerns
The converted data center was established to meet
the immediate and expanding needs of the corporation. In
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addition to meeting these needs, a small information
technology (IT) group was developed. The group's primary
responsibilities include; monitoring technological growth,
specialization of contemporary technology, and assisting the
users with the significant shifts in the types of applications
being automated. During the conversion, top corporate
management tasked the IT group with all facets of ADP
security. A risk assessment of corporate information systems
is required annually. The CERTS DSS was selected to assist in
this process. Pairwise comparisons were made of all the
criteria in the DSS. For example, credibility was deemed to
be more important than any other criteria. The rankings and
DSS assigned weights on the evaluated criteria are presented
in Table 30.
The IT group is very concerned with output
reliability and the merit of desired/required changes. This
concern falls within the scope of credibility. When dealing
with a data center, one needs to possess a strong sense of
flexibility. Data in this environment is volatile and is
constantly being altered. In this situation, data sensitivity
is primarily based on its integrity requirement and is
considered highly sensitive. The management staff is seeking
a risk management package or tool that will instill and
maintain the confidence of the analyst throughout the entire
process. The output of the process must have an obvious
relationship to the data provided.
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TABLE 30. DATA CENTER
Ranking Criteria DSS Assigned Weight
1 Credibility .354
2 Validity .240





The natural feel for the input, process, and output
of a method is supported by the amount of information
available to the user. This data center has numerous problems
with unreliable equipment, software failures, and poor
employee performance. These problems may result in a
multitude of different risk conditions. The reliability of
the package is critical to allow results to be repeated, and
therefore, has a direct bearing on the credibility of a
process. Table 31 shows the rankings and the DSS assigned
weights for the credibility subcriteria.
The validity of a risk management package closely
follows the credibility criteria. As the processing method
may be done manually or with the current computer
configuration, the package must be able to address the scope
of the processing status. The tool must be able to provide
the scope and detail required by the analyst to be valid.
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TABLE 31. CREDIBILITY
Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight
1 Intuitiveness .560
2 Reliability .440
Because of the organization's tremendous dependency on the
hardware vendor to solve problems, the relevancy of the
results are critical. The desired results should provide
categories of solutions rather than specific recommendations.
Table 32 presents the rankings and the DSS assigned weights
for the validity subcriteria.
User interface is the next concern of the
management. The average percentage of turnover in staff per
year is 40%. This turnover rate is also reflected in the risk
management staff. Therefore, management is searching for a
package that does not require the user to grasp all the
aspects of the process, but would allow an appreciation of the
requirements of the system. Understanding the process
contributes to the ease of use attribute. Again, due to such
a high turnover rate, a consistent interface must exist that
allows the analyst to concentrate on his task rather than on
the process itself. The group is seeking a package with well
written documentation, on-site training, on-site repair, and
24 hour phone support. Table 33 provides the rankings and the
DSS assigned weights for the user interface subcriteria.
68
The criterion of feasibility is of less concern to
management because the availability of the data is accessible
both within and external to the organization. The cost of
gathering the required data has been determined to be minimal.
A conscientious decision to invest the necessary effort and
time to accomplish this task has been made. Table 34 depicts
the rankings and the DSS assigned weights for the feasibility
subcriteria.
The remaining three criteria: consistency,
completeness , and adaptability are considered less important
than the first four criteria. The IT group at this time
prefers to focus on the first four criteria as the major
requirement for the system.
TABLE 32. VALIDITY




The three remaining criteria were ranked in the
order of consistency, completeness, and then adaptability.
Due to the less significance of these criteria, all
subcriteria within each criteria were determined to be of
equal importance. Tables 35, 36, and 37 summarize the
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rankings and the DSS assigned weights of the each criteria,
respectively.
The CERTS DSS selected LAVA as the best risk
management package for the data center scenario. The detailed
results are shown in Appendix F, Templates 1 through 3.
TABLE 33. USER INTERFACE
Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight
1 Understandable .230
2 Ease of Use .210
3 Support .196
4 Simplicity .188
5 Error Handling .175
TABLE 34. FEASIBILITY





Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight











Ranking Subcriteria DSS Assigned Weight
1 Modifiability .500
1 Portability .500
As with the previous two case studies, a
sensitivity analysis can be performed for the data center. If
the IT group determines that the completeness of a package
needs more emphasis, then the CERTS DSS would select BDSS as
the best risk management tool for the data center. The
sensitivity analysis is illustrated in Appendix F, Template 4.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. CERTS Decision Support System
Garrabrants and Ellis developed an approach, CERTS,
which would select the best risk management tool for a given
organizational situation. While this approach is beneficial
to organizations, it is, in its current form, very complex and
time consuming to apply. It requires answering an extensive
series of questionnaires for each risk management package that
an organization is considering. Additionally, extensive
calculations are required to synthesize the results of the
questionnaires into a suitability index that helps the
organization to select the best risk management package.
Garrabrants and Ellis' approach also offers no way to weight
certain metrics of the questionnaire which are more important
to the organization selecting the risk management package.
Combining CERTS with the AHP approach into an
automated Decision Support System alleviates many of the above
weaknesses. First, it is simple and easy to use. Second, the
decision support system does not require the analysts of the
organization to become experts in all the risk management
packages under consideration. The analysis of the risk
management packages with respect to the detailed
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subsubcriteria is already completed and incorporated in the
decision support system. Third, all calculations are done
automatically, thus saving a considerable amount of time and
effort.
The CERTS Decision Support System is based on T.L.
Saaty's Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) . Under this
approach, the decision of selecting the best risk management
package is modeled as a hierarchy. The top level is
considered the goal, and the subsequent levels represent the
criteria, subcriteria, and subsubcriteria with each succeeding
level being a refinement of the higher level. Finally, the
leaves of the hierarchy represent the alternatives, which are
the risk management packages under consideration. The basis
for making the selection is the pairwise comparison of the
criteria, subcriteria, and subsubcriteria. In this way,
organizations can place more importance on certain criteria,
subcriteria, or subsubcriteria which they deem more important
for their particular situation. After all pairwise
comparisons are made, the decision support system selects the
best risk management package for that given situation.
2. Case Studies
The case studies used for applying the CERTS Decision
Support System were based on cases that the National Institute
of Standards and Technology's Risk Management Laboratory used
in testing risk management packages. All aspects of the cases
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were based on hypothetical organizations while the management
philosophy and concerns were the authors' inferences and
conclusions based on the description of each particular case.
These inferences and conclusions were then used to
make the pairwise comparisons in the CERTS Decision Support
System. Depending on the requirement of each case, the
decision support system selected a risk management package to
best meet the needs of each organization.
When an organization, through pairwise comparison,
establishes the importance of each criteria, subcriteria, or
subsubcriteria, the CERTS Decision Support System assigns
weights to each criteria and selects the best risk management
package for the organization.
As each risk management package has its strengths and
weaknesses, and each organization has different requirements,
there is no single package that could be designated as the
package of choice for all organizations. Since the strengths
and weaknesses of each package under consideration are
incorporated in the DSS, pairwise comparisons based on the
organizations ' s requirements, will result in selecting the
best package for the organization.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
The CERTS DSS needs to include more risk management
packages, at the leaf nodes of the hierarchy, to make the tool
beneficial for organizational usage. This study used only
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three risk management packages in developing the DSS. There
are numerous risk management packages available for
organizations, and for the DSS to be effective, these packages
need to be analyzed and placed in the hierarchy so that the
package selected by the DSS is the best available package.
The criteria, subcriteria, and subsubcriteria of the DSS
need to be refined further. The metrics from Garrabrants and
Ellis' thesis were modified for this study, but further
refinement is necessary to make the DSS a more effective tool
.
Validation of the CERTS DSS needs to be accomplished on
actual case studies. This study was completed by using
hypothetical cases. To determine the effectiveness of the
DSS, real life case situations should be used for evaluation.
Elimination of infeasible alternatives should be
accomplished before the DSS is used by an organization. For
example, an organization wants to spend no more than $1,000
for the risk management package. The system should screen out
those risk management packages costing over $1,000 and








Reliability Reducing the introduction of personal
bias




Defining method for the user








Readily identifying data entry errors
Facilitating the handling of data entry
errors
Being insensitive to insignificant data
accuracy errors
Simplicity Requiring smaller knowledge base to operate
the process
Mitigating complex relationships for the
user
Defining problem domain
Not requiring special training to operate
Not requiring special training to interpret
reports
Ease of Use Having standardized interface
Differentiating one iteration clearly from
others
Being well structured and logically
sequential






Explaining relationships between phases and
iterations
Identifying decision points clearly
Support Developer providing support for product
Providing technical support by phone
Providing written documentation





Portability Applying across system configurations
Applying across processing methods
Applying across different environments
Applying across all phases of system
life cycle
Modif lability Retaining inputs in original form








Availability Requiring expert opinion for methods
internal to the organizat ion
Required data being internal to the
organization
Collection of data being convenient at
the scope desired
Practicality Allowing input in a variety of forms
Performing the process by available staff
Time being available to perform the
process
Obtaining precision economically
Scope User selecting amount of detail
Bounding detail at the level desired
Analyzing all data aspects of the system
Analyzing procedural aspects of the
system
Analyzing personnel aspects of the system
Analyzing communication aspects of the
system





Scope User selecting amount of detail
Bounding detail at the level desired
Analyzing all data aspects of the system
Analyzing procedural aspects of the system
Analyzing personnel aspects of the system
Analyzing communication aspects of the
system
Analyzing environment of the system
Elements Comprehensively considering assets
Comprehensively considering threat agents







Considering potency of threat agents
Considering undesirability of threat events
Considering effectiveness of safeguards
Considering severity of outcomes






Relevancy Expressing results in terms of solutions
rather than specifics
Results relating to significant areas of
need
Results fulfilling mandated requirements
and regulations
Output results being qualitative
Output results being quantitative
Scope User selecting amount of detail
Bounding detail at the level desired
Analyzing all data aspects of the system
Analyzing procedural aspects of the system
Analyzing personnel aspects of the system
Analyzing communication aspects of the
system
Analyzing environment of the system
Practicality Allowing input in a variety of forms
Performing the process by available staff









Delineating the relationships between
the results
Output being a perceivable relationship
with the inputs





Reliability Reducing the introduction of personal
bias
Reducing the impact of uncertainty
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APPENDIX B. CERTS DSS HIERARCHY
TEMPLATE 1.
Goal, Criteria, and Subcriteria





























































ADAPTITY STRUCTURE OF METHOD CAN BE APPLIED TO VARIOUS SYSTEMS
ATTRIBUT DETERMINATION OF OUTCOMES OR CONSEQUENCES THAT COULD RESULT
AVAILBTY DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DATA
COMPLETE PROVIDING COMPLETE COVERAGE OF ALL RISK MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
CONSISTY ABILITY TO DUPLICATE THE RESULTS OF THE PROCESS
CREDIBTY CONCLUSIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE
CSTTTERM UNIFORM SET OF TERMINOLOGY WITHIN THE SYSTEM
EASE USE A PROCESS THAT IS WELL STRUCTURED AND LOGICALLY SEQUENTIAL
ELEMENTS THREE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OPERATE TO DETERMINE THE RISK OF SYSTEM
ERORHAND IDENTIFYING INPUT ERRORS AND RESOLUTION OF THEM
FEASBITY AMOUNT OF EFFORT AND COST TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY DATA
INTUITVE RESULTS SHOULD INSTILL AND MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE OF ANALYST
MODIFITY ASSISTS ANALYSTS IN EXAMINING ALTERNATIVES OR OPTIONS
PORTABLE ABILITY TO APPLY THE PROCESS ACROSS A VARIETY OF SYSTEMS
PRACTICL CONCERNED WITH THE ECONOMICS OF GATHERING THE REQUIRED DATA
PRACTLTY FEASIBILITY OF ACCOMPLISHING DESIRED TASK
RELEVNCY RESULTS ARE MEANINGFUL TO THE SYSTEM
RELIABTY ABILITY TO OBTAIN REPEATABLE RESULTS
RELIBITY OBJECTIVITY OR THE REDUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY IN THE PROCESS
SCOPE C THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF ANALYSIS / CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF SYSTEMS
SCOPE F INFLUENCES THE ACCEPTABILITY AND USEFULNESS OF A METHOD
SCOPE V DETERMINES THE EXTENT OF THE DETAIL USED BY THE PROCESS
SIMPLE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROCESS IS CONCEALED W/0 OBSCURING THE PROCESS
SUPPORT SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE PROGRAM AND/OR THE DEVELOPER
UNDESTND ABILITY TO COMPREHEND THE UNDERLYING PREMISE THAT SUPPORTS METHOD
USEIFACE THE EFFORT NECESSARY BY OPERATOR TO UNDERSTAND COMPLETE SYSTEM
VALIDITY RESULTS OF THE PROCESS REPRESENT REALITY
L LOCAL PRIORITY: PRIORITY RELATIVE TO PARENT
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TEMPLATE 2.
Criteria, Subcriteria, and Subsubcriteria





! L 0.500! L 0.500!
!-BIAS -LANGUAGE
! L 0.500 L 0.250
!
-UNCERTTY -DEFINED





BIAS MECHANISM TO REDUCE THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONAL BIAS
CONSISTY ABILITY TO DUPLICATE THE RESULTS OF THE PROCESS
CSTTTERM UNIFORM SET OF TERMINOLOGY WITHIN THE SYSTEM
DEFINED METHOD'S ELEMENTS DEFINED FOR THE USER
INPUTRQT INPUT REQUESTED UNAMBIGUOUS
LANGUAGE STANDARD LANGUAGE ESTABLISHED
RELIBITY OBJECTIVITY OR THE REDUCTION OF SUBJECTIVITY IN THE PROCESS
REQUEST METHOD REQUEST INPUT IN DESIGNATED UNITS
UNCERTTY PROVIDE A MECHANISM THAT REDUCES THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY
















! L 0.200! L 0.200! L 0.200! L 0.200! . L 0.200!
J-IDENT -KNOUBASE -INTERFAC -PREMISE -PRODUCT
! L 0.333 L 0.200 L 0.250 L 0.200 L 0.250
!-DATAENTY -RELATION -ITERATIO -COMPREHD -PHONE
i L 0.333 L 0.200 L 0.250 L 0.200 . L 0.250
!-SENSITVE -DOMAIN -PROCESS -TERMS -DOCUMENT
! L 0.333 L 0.200 L 0.250 . L 0.200 L 0.250
-TRAINING -RELEVANT -PHASES .-SITETRNG
L 0.200 L 0.250 L 0.200 L 0.250
-RPTTRAIN -POINTS
L 0.200 L 0.200
COMPREHD COMPREHENDIBLE PREMISE
DATAENTY THE HANDLING OF DATA ENTRY ERRORS
DOCUMENT DEVELOPER PROVIDES URITTEN DOCUMENTATION OF PROGRAM
DOMAIN PROBLEM DOMAIN WELL DEFINED
EASE USE A PROCESS THAT IS UELL STRUCTURED AND LOGICALLY SEQUENTIAL
ERORHAND IDENTIFYING INPUT ERRORS AND RESOLUTION OF THEM
IDENT DATA ENTRY ERROR IDENTIFICATION
INTERFAC STANDARDIZED INTERFACE
ITERATIO ITERATION CLEARLY DIFFERENTIATED FROM ANOTHER
KNOUBASE SMALLER KNOWLEDGE BASE REQUIRED TO OPERATE THE PROCESS
PHASES R'SHIPS BETWEEN ELEMENTS EXPLAINED BETWEEN PHASES OR ITERATIONS
PHONE TECHNICAL SUPPORT PROVIDED BY PHONE CONVERSATION
POINTS DECISION POINTS CLEARLY IDENTIFIED
PREMISE UNDERLYING PREMISE EXPLAINED
PROCESS PROCESS WELL STRUCTURED AND LOGICALLY SEQUENTIAL
PRODUCT DEVELOPER PROVIDES SUPPORT FOR HIS PRODUCT/PROGRAM
RELATION COMPLEX RELATIONSHIPS MITIGATED FOR THE USER
RELEVANT INFORMATION REQUESTED OF THE USER RELEVANT
RPTTRAIN TRAINING TO INTERPRET REPORTS
SENSITVE INSENSITIVE TO INSIGNIFICANT DATA ACCURACY ERRORS
SIMPLE COMPLEXITY OF THE PROCESS IS CONCEALED W/0 OBSCURING THE PROCESS
SITETRNG DEVELOPER PROVIDES TRAINING ON SITE
SUPPORT SUPPORT PROVIDED BY THE PROGRAM AND/OR THE DEVELOPER
TERMS TERMS UNAMBIGUOUSLY DEFINED
TRAINING SPECIAL TRAINING REQUIRED TO OPERATE/UNDERSTAND PROGRAM
UNDESTND ABILITY TO COMPREHEND THE UNDERLYING PREMISE THAT SUPPORTS METHOD
USEIFACE THE EFFORT NECESSARY BY OPERATOR TO UNDERSTAND COMPLETE SYSTEM






















ADAPTITY STRUCTURE OF METHOD CAN BE APPLIED TO VARIOUS SYSTEMS
ENVIRONS PROCESS APPLIED ACROSS ENVIRONMENTS (TERMINAL/DISTRIBUTED)
LIFECYLC PROCESS APPLIED ACROSS ALL PHASES OF THE SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
MODIFITY ASSISTS ANALYSTS IN EXAMINING ALTERNATIVES OR OPTIONS
ORIGINAL INPUT VALUES RETAINED IN THEIR ORIGINAL FORM
PARTITON CALCULATIONS SEGMENTED BY IDENTIFIABLE PARTITIONS
PORTABLE ABILITY TO APPLY THE PROCESS ACROSS A VARIETY OF SYSTEMS
PRO METH PROCESS APPLIED ACROSS PROCESSING METHODS (BATCH/INTERACTIVE)
SYS CON PROCESS IS APPLIED ACROSS SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS^ MAIN/MINI/MICRO
)
TAILOR SOFTUARE PACKAGE CAN BE MODIFIED
L LOCAL PRIORITY: PRIORITY RELATIVE TO PARENT
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TEMPLATE 2. (continued)






































ACCOMPLH TIME IS AVAILABLE TO PERFORM THE PROCESS
AVAILBTY DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DATA
BOUND METHOD BOUNDS THE DETAIL AT THE LEVEL DESIRED
CNVENINT DATA COLLECTION CONVENIENT AT THE SCOPE DESIRED
COMM ALL COMMUNICATIONS ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEMS ARE ANALYZED
DASPECTS ALL DATA ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
DETAIL AMOUNT OF DETAIL USER SELECTABLE
ENVIROMT THE ENVIRONMENT THAT THE SYSTEM RESIDES IN IS ANALYZED
FEASBITY AMOUNT OF EFFORT AND COST TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY DATA
INTERNAL ALL DATA REQUIRED IS INTERNAL TO THE ORGANIZATION
OPINION EXPERT OPINION REOUIRED FOR THE METHODS INTERNAL TO ORGANIZATION
PERFORM AVAILABLE STAFF PERFORMS THE PROCESS
PERSONEL ALL PERSONNEL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
PRACTICL CONCERNED WITH THE ECONOMICS OF GATHERING THE REOUIRED DATA
PRECISON PRECISION CAN BE OBTAINED ECONOMICALLY
PROCEDUR THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
SCOPE F INFLUENCES THE ACCEPTABILITY AND USEFULNESS OF A METHOD
VARIETY ALLOWS INPUT DATA IN A VARIETY OF FORMS
L LOCAL PRIORITY: PRIORITY RELATIVE TO PARENT
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TEMPLATE 2. (continued)





! SCOPE C ! ELEMENTS! ATTRIBUT!
! L 0.333! L 0.333! L 0.333!
!
-DETAIL -ASSETS -VALUES
! L 0.143 L 0.167 . L 0.167
!
-BOUND -T AGENTS -POTENCY
! L 0.143 L 0.167 . L 0.167
!-DASPECTS -T EVENTS -UNDESIRE
! L 0.143 L 0.167 L 0.167
!
-PROCEDUR -SAFEGURD -EFFCTVNS
! L 0.143 L 0.167 L 0.167
!-PERSONEL -VULNERBY -SEVERITY
! L 0.143 L 0.167 L 0.167
!
-COMM -OUTCOMES -PROBABTY
! L 0.143 L 0.167 L 0.167
-ENVIROMT
L 0.143
ASSETS COMPREHENSIVELY CONSIDER ASSETS
ATTRIBUT DETERMINATION OF OUTCOMES OR CONSEOUENCES THAT COULD RESULT
BOUND METHOD BOUNDS THE DETAIL AT THE LEVEL DESIRED
COMM ALL COMMUNICATIONS ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEMS ARE ANALYZED
COMPLETE PROVIDING COMPLETE COVERAGE OF ALL RISK MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
DASPECTS ALL DATA ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
DETAIL AMOUNT OF DETAIL USER SELECTABLE
EFFCTVNS SAFEGUARD EFFECTIVENESS IS CONSIDERED
ELEMENTS THREE CENTRAL ELEMENTS OPERATE TO DETERMINE THE RISK OF SYSTEM
ENVIROMT THE ENVIRONMENT THAT THE SYSTEM RESIDES IN IS ANALYZED
OUTCOMES CONSIDER OUTCOMES
PERSONEL ALL PERSONNEL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
POTENCY POTENCY OF A THREAT AGENT IS CONSIDERED
PROBABTY PROBABILITY OF THE OCCURENCE OF A THREAT EVENT IS CONSIDERED
PROCEDUR THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
SAFEGURD COMPREHENSIVELY CONSIDER SAFEGUARDS
SCOPE C THE LEVEL OF DETAIL OF ANALYSIS / CONSIDER ALL ASPECTS OF SYSTEMS
SEVERITY SEVERITY OF OUTCOME IS CONSIDERED
T AGENTS COMPREHENSIVELY CONSIDER THREAT AGENTS
T EVENTS COMPREHENSIVELY CONSIDER THREAT EVENTS
UNDESIRE UNDESIRABILITY OF A THREAT EVENT IS CONSIDERED
VALUES ASSET VALUES CONSIDERED
VULNERBY COMPREHENSIVELY CONSIDER VULNERABILITIES
L LOCAL PRIORITY: PRIORITY RELATIVE TO PARENT
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TEMPLATE 2. (continued)
i i i i
[VALIDITY I
L 0.143!
!RELEVNCY! SCOPE V !
i
PRACTLTY!
! L 0.333! . L 0.333! L 0.333!
!
-SOLUTION -DETAIL -VARIETY
! L 0.200 L 0.143 L 0.250
J-SIGNIFCT -BOUND -PERFORM
! L 0.200 L 0.143 L 0.250
!
-REQURMTS -DASPECTS -ACCOMPLH
! L 0.200 L 0.143 L 0.250
!
-QUALITY -PROCEDUR -PRECISON
! L 0.200 L 0.143 L 0.250
!
-QUANTITY -PERSONEL





ACCOMPLH TIME IS AVAILABLE TO PERFORM THE PROCESS
BOUND METHOD BOUNDS THE DETAIL AT THE LEVEL DESIRED
COMM ALL COMMUNICATIONS ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEMS ARE ANALYZED
DASPECTS ALL DATA ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
DETAIL AMOUNT OF DETAIL USER SELECTABLE
ENVIROMT THE ENVIRONMENT THAT THE SYSTEM RESIDES IN IS ANALYZED
PERFORM AVAILABLE STAFF PERFORMS THE PROCESS
PERSONEL ALL PERSONNEL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
PRACTLTY FEASIBILITY OF ACCOMPLISHING DESIRED TASK
PRECISON PRECISION CAN BE OBTAINED ECONOMICALLY
PROCEDUR THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
QUALITY DESIRED OUTPUT RESULTS ARE QUALITATIVE
QUANTITY DESIRED OUTPUT RESULTS ARE QUANTIATIVE
RELEVNCY RESULTS ARE MEANINGFUL TO THE SYSTEM
REQURMTS FULFILLS MANDATED REQUIREMENTS OR REGULATIONS
SCOPE V DETERMINES THE EXTENT OF THE DETAIL USED BY THE PROCESS
SIGNIFCT RESULTS RELATE TO SIGNIFICANT AREAS OF NEED
SOLUTION RESULTS ARE EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF SOLUTIONS RATHER THAN SPECIFICS
VALIDITY RESULTS OF THE PROCESS REPRESENT REALITY
VARIETY ALLOWS INPUT DATA IN A VARIETY OF FORMS

























BIAS MECHANISM TO REDUCE THE INTRODUCTION OF PERSONAL BIAS
COMM ALL COMMUNICATIONS ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEMS ARE ANALYZED
CREDIBTY CONCLUSIONS ARE ACCEPTABLE
DASPECTS ALL DATA ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
DELINETE DELINEATES THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE ELEMENTS
ENVIROMT THE ENVIRONMENT THAT THE SYSTEM RESIDES IN IS ANALYZED
INTUITVE RESULTS SHOULD INSTILL AND MAINTAIN CONFIDENCE OF ANALYST
PERCEIVE OUTPUT HAS A PERCEIVALBLE RELATIONSHIP UITH THE INPUTS
PERSONEL ALL PERSONNEL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
PROCEDUR THE PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE SYSTEM ARE ANALYZED
RELIABTY ABILITY TO OBTAIN REPEATABLE RESULTS
UNCERTTY PROVIDE A MECHANISM THAT REDUCES THE IMPACT OF UNCERTAINTY
L LOCAL PRIORITY: PRIORITY RELATIVE TO PARENT
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Subsubcriteria: Requesting Input Unambiguously
BDSS 558
LAVA .122
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Subcriteria: Ease of Use
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Subsubcriteria: Applying Across Processing Methods
BDSS 333
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Subsubcriteria: Analyzing All Data Aspects of the System
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Subsubcriteria: Analyzing Communication Aspects of the System
BDSS 474









Subsubcriteria: Analyzing Environment of the System
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Subsubcriteria: User Selecting Amount of Detail
BDSS
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Subsubcriteria: Analyzing Personnel Aspects of the System
BDSS .333
LAVA .333
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Subsubcriteria: Reducing the Introduction of Personal Bias
BDSS 333
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APPENDIX D. CERTS DSS RESULTS FOR HIDE AREA NETWORK CASE
STUDY
TEMPLATE 1.
Distributed Wide Area Network
A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION METHOD FOR RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Sorted Synthesis of Leaf Nodes with respect to GOAL
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APPENDIX E. CERTS DSS RESULTS POR BIOMED CASE STUDY
TEMPLATE 1.
System Under Development - Biomed
A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION METHOD FOR RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Sorted Synthesis of Leaf Nodes with respect to GOAL
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APPENDIX F. CERTS DSS RESULTS FOR DATA CENTER CASE STUDY
TEMPLATE 1.
Data Center
A COMPARATIVE EVALUATION METHOD FOR RISK MANAGEMENT TOOLS
Sorted Synthesis of Leaf Nodes with respect to GOAL
OVERALL INCONSISTENCY INDEX = 0.00
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